Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner's curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.
Introduction
Popular intuition suggests that more bidders participating in a common-value auction should increase the probability of the adverse selection problem referred to as "winner's curse," the possibility that the winner pays more than the value (cf. Thaler 1988; Krishna 2002) , since this increases the winner's overestimating problem and induces more aggressive bidding. However, the precise relationship between the winner's curse and the number of bidders in common-value auctions has not been not explored in great detail in the literature, while the number of active bidders can potentially be an important instrumental variable in auction design, one that significantly affects the outcome. 1 It is important that policy-makers understand this relationship when they implicitly restrict the number of bidders in an auction, for instance by selling a product that only a couple of well-known incumbents can afford, or in the opposite case when auction entry is highly encouraged. The results in this paper suggest that under certain conditions both can be justified.
In this paper, the impact of the number of bidders on the winner's curse is examined in the context of firstand second-price sealed-bid affiliated value auctions. Given that neither the incidence of the winner's curse nor the value-at-risk can be expressed in closed form, the analysis resorts to numerical simulations using linear equilibrium bidding strategies. For both auction formats and all levels of affiliation of valuations, the number of bidders is shown to be a key factor, affecting not only the probability of occurrence of the winner's curse, but also the relative losses of the winner. Strikingly, while both auction formats rank identically in terms of expected revenue, their ranking on both aspects relating to the winner's curse depends on both the level of affiliation and the number of bidders.
Model and Equilibrium
There are risk-neutral active bidders, each of whom independently receives a private signal drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval, i.e. ∼ [0; 1]. 2 We assume that the value of the item to each bidder is a convex combination of his private signal and the average over all bidders' signals:
with ∈ [0, 1] and where
is the component of the value that is common to all bidders. Hence, one of the extremes (at = 0) implies the independent private valuations (IPV) model, while the other extreme (at = 1) determines a pure common value (CV) model. The unique symmetric linear equilibrium bidding functions for the first-and the second-price sealed-bid auctions in this affiliated value setup are given in (Klemperer 1999, 258-259): i. The unique symmetric linear equilibrium bidding function for the first-price sealed-bid affiliated value auction is
ii. The unique symmetric linear equilibrium bidding function for the second-price sealed-bid affiliated value auction is
The model meets all conditions for revenue equivalence enumerated in Proposition 3.1 of Krishna (2002) and hence both auction formats generate equal expected revenues. This expected revenue of
is decreasing in and increasing in .
In both auction formats, relative to the pure IPV model, bidders shade their equilibrium bids by −2 2 , which increases in both the level of affiliation and the number of bidders , in order to accommodate the probability of the winner's curse. Due to the standard bid shading factor −1 in the first-price auction, bidders shade their bids more in absolute terms in the second-price auction.
Indeed, a posteriori, after having won the auction but not being informed about other bidders' bids (or signals), and only inferring from winning that others have received a signal lower than his signal , the winning bidder still expects a positive payoff of̃=
in both auction formats. 3 Nevertheless, the winning bidder may still be affected by the winner's curse in the sense of ending up with a negative ex-post payoff, after having learned the other bidders' bids and with that his true valuation. It is the likelihood of such events that is the main focus of the next section.
The Winner's Curse
The probability that the winner is cursed in the auction equals the probability that the highest (second-highest) bid, which is the price being paid for the object, is above the winner's valuation. Deriving this probability boils down to computing the volume of a polytope, which is described by a union of systems of inequalities, based on the bidding functions in eq. (1) or eq. (2). It is possible to estimate this probability for the first-and secondprice auction for low number of bidders, when the dimensions of the polytope are low. However, computing the volume of a polytope is "#P-hard ..., and a simple task only for low dimensions." (Peña et al., 2016) . For this reason we resort to simulations to numerically estimate it. Figure 1 shows the probability for the winner being cursed for various numbers of bidders ∈ {2, … , 12} and weights ∈ {0.50, 0.75, 1.00} for the first-and second-price auction formats. 4 For both auction formats, the incidence of the winner's curse is increasing in both the number of bidders n and the level of affiliation α. Beyond the bid shading in order to account for the winner's curse, which was discussed in the previous section, the standard bid shading (by factor −1 ) further suppresses this phenomenon in the first-price auction, while having to pay a price equal to the second-highest bid has an analogous impact in the second-price auction setting. Which effect dominates depends on both the level of affiliation and the number of bidders .
We find that for low levels of the winner's curse is more severe in the second-price auction than in the first-price auction for any . The reason is that the effect of the standard bid shading in the first-price auction dominates the effect of the additional uncertainty about the price paid in the second-price auction. For values of around 0.75, the winner's curse is more severe in the second-price auction for low values of , where the effect of standard bid shading in the first-price auction is rather high, while it is more severe in the first-price auction for high values of . For high values of , the winner's curse is more severe in the first-price auction than in the second-price auction for any . The intuition behind this finding is that for high values of , the second-highest signal provides a better estimate of the value than the highest signal, which together with the additional bid shading by the second-highest signal holder suppresses the winner's curse.
While Figure 1 focused on the winner's curse occurring or not, Figure 2 highlights the severity of the winner's curse as quantified by the value-at-risk. In the present context, the value-at-risk at a given confidence level ∈ (0, 1) is the value such that with probability the winner's ex-post loss exceeds this value . Relatedly, the expected shortfall is the expected loss in these percent worst cases. For = 0.05, and for various levels of affiliation , Figure 2 presents the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall for the first-and second-price auction as a function of the number of bidders . 5 Both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall follow the same ranking over the two auction formats as found for the incidence of the winner's curse, with the format being inferior in terms of the winner's curse incidence also being inferior in terms of value-at-risk and expected shortfall. For both auction formats, given any number of bidders , the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall are increasing in the level of affiliation . More surprisingly, for both auction formats, given a level of affiliation , both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall increase up to a certain number of bidders , while beyond this number they decrease.
Conclusion
From a design perspective, the first takeaway from this investigation is that in order to mitigate either the incidence of the winner's curse or the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall, the second-price auction is preferred only in situations where the individual valuations for the auctioned object are highly affiliated; for low levels of affiliation, the first-price auction is preferred. Interestingly, while in terms of expected revenue the two auction formats are equivalent, there is an intermediate range of levels of affiliation where the preferred auction format depends on the number of bidders, with the first-price auction performing better only when the number of bidders is not too high.
The second takeaway concerns stimulating auction participation. For both auction formats and all levels of affiliation, expected revenues and the incidence of the winner's curse are increasing in the number of bidders, while the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall are inverse U-shaped in the number of bidders. The latter result implies that beyond a certain threshold for the number of bidders, the decision to encourage further participation is a trade-off between increasing revenues and the likelihood of an ex-post loss and decreasing the expected ex-post losses. Up to this threshold, a further decrease in the number of bidders is in favour of the (remaining) bidders in the sense that their potential losses decrease in two ways: both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall and the likelihood of a winner's curse decrease. Here, although it is to the benefit of expected auction revenues, implicitly or explicitly stimulating a higher number of active bidders exposes the winners to much higher risk of serious harm, which should be a warning sign for auction designers. For example, if a government does not want to scare off potential investors with a record of bankruptcies in a specific industry or increase its bailout budget, this effect must be taken into consideration.
Notes
1 For first-price pure common value auctions, experimental studies reveal the winner's curse to be more severe with 6-7 bidders competing than with 3-4 bidders competing and that even experienced bidders cannot significantly mitigate the probability of being struck by the winner's curse (cf. Kagel and Levin 1986; Kagel and Dyer 1988; Kagel et al. 1989; Dyer et al., 1989; Garvin and Kagel, 1994) . 2 The results are replicated if we take the slightly more general beta distribution with ( , 1), of which the uniform distribution is a special case when = 1. 3 In fact, in the second-price auction, even after being informed about the price and inferring the second-highest bidder's signal ≤ , the winner has a positive payoff expectation of̃2 , =
(1− ) + ( − ). 4 For all combinations of values for and considered, the probabilities reported are based on 10 7 random draws for the bidders' signals.
5 Qualitatively, the situation does not look different when taking other commonly used values for .
